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Abstract
The paper, following a suggestion by Kripke, argues that 
there is an illuminating analogy between Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy and Austrian economics (particularly that of 
Mises and Hayek).  Most scholars interpret paragraph 
608 of Wittgenstein’s Zettel (hereafter Z608) to suggest 
that language might arise out of physical chaos at the 
neural centre.  Since, however, Wittgenstein holds that 
the philosopher must not advance theories, he cannot 
consistently be advancing such theories in Z608.  Rather, 
all the key concepts in Z608 must be cashed in terms of 
Wittgenstein’s “forms of life”.  Thus, Z608, read carefully, 
suggests that language “arises”, not out of chaos in the 
brain, but out of the chaotic activities in human forms of 
life.  The paper shows that an analogous picture occurs 
in the early Austrian economists (such as Hayek, who is 
Wittgenstein’s cousin, and Mises). Z608 is part of a still 
unappreciated Austrian movement that emphasizes the 
creative chaos in human life.  In this connection the paper 
explains how Z608 is an application of Wittgenstein’s 
“private language argument” against a neural theory 
of a private language. Finally, the paper shows that 
the real argument in Z608 traces to early Austrian 
phenomenology—shedding light both on Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy and on Austrian economics.
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INTRODUCTION
No supposition seems to me more natural than that there is no 
process in the brain correlated with associating or  with thinking; 
so that it would be impossible to read off thought processes from 
brain processes. I mean this: If I talk or write, there is, I assume, 
a system of impulses going out from my brain and correlated 
with my spoken or written thoughts. But why should the system 
continue further in the direction of the centre? Why should this 
order not proceed, so to speak, out of chaos?  
                                           Wittgenstein, Zettel (1970, pgh. 608)
1
The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden 
by their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice 
something—because it is always before one’s eyes.)
        Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (1958, pgh. 129)
Although most scholars understand Wittgenstein 
against the background of Anglo-American linguistic 
philosophy, it is important to remember that he was 
educated in a distinctive Austrian intellectual tradition 
that included both a philosophical tradition with roots in 
Brentano’s and Husserl’s phenomenological schools and 
a distinctive Austrian economic tradition, a version of 
market economics most closely associated with Menger, 
Mises and Hayek (Smith, 1994).2  The present paper 
argues that Wittgenstein’s philosophy of language 
1 Wittgenstein’s works are abbreviated thus:  Notebooks, 1914-
16  [NB]; Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus [TLP]; Philosophical 
Investigations [PI]; Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics 
[RFM]; Zettel  [Z]; On Certainty [OC]; Culture and Value [CV]. 
References to TLP are by proposition number, to NB and CV, by 
page number, to PI, Z and OC, unless indicated otherwise, by 
paragraph number, to RFM, by section and paragraph number.  
2 Austrian economics has roots in Adam Smith (Callahan, 2004, 
pp.19-20).  The relation of Milton Friedman to the Austrian school 
is complex.  Although he has criticized some aspects of the Austrian 
school (Friedman, 1993), he is also heavily influenced by them 
(Friedman, 1990, p.6).  For these reasons Friedman is employed in 
the present paper only as a source of the pencil-example and for his 
commentary on Hayek’s views. 
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bears an illuminating analogy with aspects of Austrian 
economics.3
The idea of such an analogy has been suggested 
before.  Kripke (1982, pp.112-113) remarks that there 
is an analogy between Wittgenstein’s “private language 
argument” and Mises’ argument that rational economic 
calculation under socialism is impossible. Waismann, 
Wittgenstein’s main link to the Vienna circle, had close 
connections to Menger and Mises (Haller, 1988, p.11, 
28, 38, 42).  Menger wrote the Forward to Waismann’s 
Introduction to Mathematical Thinking and Menger’s 
Dimensionstheorie is discussed in the book. Finally, 
Hayek was Wittgenstein’s cousin (Monk, 1991, p.518; 
Smith, 1994, p.304).   The key passage in Wittgenstein for 
the present interpretation is pgh. 608 of Zettel (hereafter 
Z608) where Wittgenstein is usually understood to claim 
that language may arise out of neural chaos.  
There are two main interpretations of Z608, the 
neurological interpretation (hereafter NI) and the religious-
cosmological interpretation (hereafter RCI). According 
to NI, the centre and the chaos mentioned in Z608 are the 
neural centre and neural chaos, which mean that Z608 
suggests that language and thought may arise out of chaos 
at the neural centre.  Based on  Wittgenstein’s remark to 
Drury that he looks at problems from a religious point of 
view (Malcolm, 1997, p.1), RCI, holds that Z608 employs 
religious creation language (the emergence of order from 
chaos) to compare the production of language to the 
creation of a cosmos.  Although the present paper agrees 
with RCI’s critique of NI, some may find RCI to be too 
metaphorical.  The present paper develops an Austrian 
Economic Model of Z608 (hereafter AEM) that is more 
concrete than RCI.  The claim is not that Z608 is really 
about economic matters, but that its picture of the genesis of 
language in Z608 is instructively analogous to the Austrian 
view of the genesis of economic value in free-markets.
§ 1 summarises RCI’s critique of NI.  § 2 briefly 
sketches RCI. § 3 explains the basic points of the 
Austrian economic calculation model.  § 4 explains the 
Austrian model of Z608.  § 5 briefly discusses the analogy 
between the Austrian economic calculation argument and 
Wittgenstein’s “private language” argument. § 6 argues 
that the key analogy linking Z608 to Austrian economics 
is that both are descriptions of given human forms of life.
1.  CRITIQUE OF THE NEUROPHYSIOLOGICAL 
INTERPRETATION 
[I]n Zettel 608-610 [Wittgenstein] … suggests that for all we 
know, our  behaviour could proceed from internal physical chaos, 
…              
McGinn, Wittgenstein on Meaning (1984, pp.112-113)
3 The present paper is concerned primarily with Wittgenstein’s 
later philosophy in PI, RFM, Z, OC, and CV.  However, occasional 
references are made to his “early” TLP and NB.
[W]e must not advance any kind of theory. … We must do away 
with all explanation and description alone must take its place.
      Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (1958, pgh.109)
Since RCI’s argument against NI have been stated 
elsewhere (McDonough, 2013, 2014a, 2014b), it is only 
necessary to summarize them here.  NI’s main theses are:
    T1.) Z608 suggests that language and thought may 
              arise out of chaos.
T2.)  The chaos here is chaos at the neural centre.
T3.)  This chaos, is, therefore, physical chaos.
T4.) Z608, therefore, undermines the standard 
         scientific view about the neural basis for language 
         and thought.
In fact, Z608 does not endorse any of T1-T4. First, 
Z608 does not state, as T1 claims, that linguistic meaning 
(hereafter meaningL) and mental content (hereafter 
contentM) may arise out of chaos.
4  It states only that 
these may “sozusagen” (so to speak) do so. Wittgenstein’s 
method is to make illuminating comparisons (PI, 126, 
131; RFM ,V.12; Z327; OC, 64; CV, 14, 26): “What I 
invent are “new similes” (CV, 19).  That is, Z608 is stated 
in figurative language.
Since Wittgenstein does not advance theories, Z608, to 
be consistent with Wittgenstein’s method, cannot, as T2 
claims, refer to the neural centre.  The centre referenced 
in Z608 has to be of a kind that is “always before one’s 
eyes”—and at PI (108) Wittgenstein refers to “ordinary life” 
as the “Angelpunkt of our real need.”  Although Anscombe 
translates “Angelpunkt” as “fixed point,” it literally 
means the centre-point around which the circle is drawn 
by a compass.  Similarly, at RFM (III.15) Wittgenstein 
identifies “the centre-of-gravity of mathematics” as 
action.  That is, the centre referenced in Z608 is, roughly 
speaking, the arena of shared human activities that make up 
Wittgenstein’s “forms of life” (PI, 230).
This is confirmed by a close reading of Z608.  Consider 
the 2nd-4th sentences in Z608 (numbered for convenience): 
(S1) There is, I assume, a system of impulses going out from my 
brain and correlated with my spoken or written thoughts.  (S2)  
But why should the system continue further in the direction of the 
centre?  (S3)  Why should this order not proceed, sozusagen, out 
of chaos
In opposition to NI, S1 endorses the standard scientific 
view that there is a system of neural impulses that 
correlates with public behaviour (spoken and written 
sentences).  NI mistakenly assumes that the word “centre” 
in S2 means the neural centre, but a careful reading reveals 
that this is not the neural centre.  Since S1 specifies that the 
impulses move from the brain towards the world of public 
linguistic behaviour, and since S2, read naturally, asks why 
this system should continue further in that direction, the 
centre mentioned in S2 is in that public world—and that 
4 For simplicity, the present paper couches the argument in terms of 
meaningL, but an analogous argument can be made for contentM.
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is the location of Wittgenstein’s “Angelpunkt of our real 
need” (PI, 108). 
There is, however, an implicit reference to the neural 
centre in Z608.  One can define the neural centre (or 
centren) as those neural structures that produce the system 
of neural impulses.  Since, however, the whole point of 
Z608 is that the real centre of language, “the Anglepunkt 
of our real need” (PI, 108), is in the social world of shared 
human action, call this the social centre (or centresoc). 
That is, since Wittgenstein describes only what is “always 
before one’s eyes” (PI, 129), this centre must be “always 
before one’s eyes”—but that is the centresoc, not the centren. 
Thus, Z608 distinguishes the centren from the centresoc and 
claims, roughly, that there is no reason to hold that the 
material centren system explains the human activities in 
the centresoc of language.  Indeed, the main point of Z608 
is to replace the old centredn account of meaningL with a 
centredsoc model (McDonough, 1989, pp.18-20).
This clarifies the notion of chaos in Z608. Since the 
centre in T2 is not the centren, the chaos referenced in T1 
and T3 cannot be neural chaos.  For this chaos too must be 
“always before one’s eyes.”  Wittgenstein remarks at CV 
(65) that the philosopher must “descend” into “primeval 
chaos” and learn to feel at “home” there.  But Wittgenstein’s 
philosopher is at “home” in the “Angelpunkt of our real 
need,” i.e., ordinary life—not in the cranial cavity.  Thus, 
the chaos referenced in Z608 is chaossoc, not chaosn. 
Wittgenstein’s description of the chaos in human activities 
is found on virtually every page of his later philosophy. 
One illuminating passage is at Z567 where he refers to “the 
great swarm [ganze Gewimmel] of human actions” as 
“the background against which we see any action”.  This 
swarming chaos of human activities constitute the “real 
foundations of [our] inquiry” (PI, 7, 129).  Z608 does not 
suggest that meaningL arises out of chaosn at the centren. 
Z608 advances no theories about neural chaos.  Rather, 
Z608 suggests that meaningL arises in a very different 
(non-causal) sense out of the chaossoc of activities at the 
centresoc of forms of life.
5
Finally, Z608 does not, as T4 holds, undermine the 
orthodox scientific belief of the neural basis of language. 
S1 endorses that view:  “[T]here is, I assume, a system 
…”).  The illusion that Z608 denies this scientific view 
is produced by the mistaken interpretation that the centre 
and chaos referenced in Z608 are the neural centre and 
neural chaos.  Once it is recognized that this centre and 
chaos are, respectively, the centre of forms of life and the 
chaotic Ganze Gewimmal of human behaviour in forms of 
life, this illusion evaporates.  Thus, when Z608 asks why 
that neural system should continue further in the direction 
5 The account of the non-causal sense in which meaningL “arises” 
out of a chaotic swarm of behaviour is analogous to the sense in 
which Austrian Gestalt-psychologists held that a figure “arises” 
out of a “chaos” of dots on canvas, but this must be left for another 
occasion.
of the centre, it is asking why that neural system should 
continue further towards the “Angelpunkt of our real 
need” (ordinary life)—and when Z608 asks why meaningL 
cannot arise, sozusagen, out of chaos, it is not asking 
why meaningL cannot arise out of neural chaos, but why 
meaningL cannot arise out of chaotic Ganze Gewimmel 
of human actions in the Angelpunkt of forms of life.  For 
those kinds of centresoc and chaossoc are as Wittgenstein 
requires “already before one’s eyes”.
2.  THE RELIGIOUS-COSMOLOGICAL 
MODEL OF ZETTEL 608 
When Wittgenstein was working on the latter part of the 
Philosophical Investigations, he said to his … friend Drury: … “I 
am not a religious man but I cannot help seeing every problem 
from a religious point of view.”
Malcolm, Wittgenstein: From a Religious Point of View? (1997, 
p.1)
To resolve … philosophical problems one has to compare things 
which it has never occurred to anyone seriously to compare.
Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (§ 
V.12)
In Wittgenstein’s remark to Drury (hereafter WRD) 
Wittgenstein says he looks at philosophical problems 
“from a religious point of view,” but that does not mean 
that he holds any religious views. WRD also states 
that he is “not a religious man.”  WRD only claims 
that Wittgenstein employs religious ideas to achieve 
perspective on philosophical problems. Just as Dennett 
(1996) takes an “intentional stance” on human beings 
without endorsing the existence of intentions, WRD 
states that Wittgenstein takes a “religious stance” on 
philosophical problems without committing him to any 
religious views. 
The key images in Z608 (the centre, chaos, and the 
emergence of order), are seminal images in Western 
cosmogony tracing to Hesiod’s Theogony and transmitted 
through the ages by a plethora of philosophers, scientists, 
theologians, and poets, including Wittgenstein’s fellow 
Austrian Martin Buber, and Augustine and Goethe, who 
influenced Wittgenstein (McDonough, 2014).  Indeed, 
similar religious-cosmological imagery is employed by 
many recent “chaos theorists” in chemistry, biology, 
ecology, economics, psychology, etc., to re-conceptualize 
numerous scientific problems (Gleick, 1997; Faggini & 
Parziale, 2012)—but no one thinks this commits them to 
religious views.  Z608 is about meaningL and contentM, 
not religion or cosmology. Wittgenstein only employs 
religious-cosmological similes in Z608 to suggest new 
perspectives his philosophical problems.   
The idea of an intimate connection between language 
and cosmology has roots in Wittgenstein’s early 
philosophy. At NB (84) Wittgenstein describes man [der 
4Copyright © Canadian Research & Development Center of Sciences and Cultures
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Mensch] as the microcosm and at TLP (5.63) he states 
“I am my world (the microcosm)”.6 Indeed, he adds 
that “the limits of my language mean the limits of my 
world” (TLP, 5.6).  Although he does not endorse the 
microcosmic doctrine in his later philosophy, he never 
renounced it.  Thus, when he moves away from the static 
conception of language in his earlier philosophy to the 
more dynamical conception in his later philosophy, it 
became natural for him to apply the creation models from 
cosmogony to his new view.  By the static conception of 
language in his early philosophy is meant the views in 
TLP and NB in an eternal unchangeable logical structure 
underlying language and the associated dismissal of the 
importance of history to his philosophical views: “What 
has history to do with me?” (NB, 82).  By the time of 
his later philosophy, Wittgenstein has reversed himself, 
describing his philosophical remarks as “remarks on the 
natural history of human beings” (PI, 25, 415).   Since 
cosmogony, the description of absolute beginnings, 
is the ultimate in historical development, it becomes 
useful in his later philosophy to produce a cosmogony 
of meaningL—with a crucial proviso. Although his later 
philosophy emphasizes natural history, it need not be an 
actual history.  At (PI, 230) he remarks that “a fictitious 
natural history” is sufficient “for our purposes.”  Z608 is 
such a fictitious natural history, a fictional cosmogony, 
of meaningL.  By employing this fiction he hopes to 
achieve a liberating perspective on meaningL.  Since this 
cosmogony is fictitious, none of his remarks there have 
anything to do with scientific theories.
In summary, according to RCI , Z608 employs 
religious-cosmological language as a source of useful 
similes to clarify philosophical problems concerning 
meaningL.  Z608 compares the production of meaningL 
to something no one has ever compared it to before: the 
creation of the cosmos.  Thus, the key concepts in the 
archetypal creation stories are applied to language. Just as 
the ancient cosmos arises out of chaos, human language 
arises, sozusagen, of out “chaos” of human actions.  The 
“sozusagen” indicates that Wittgenstein is not proposing 
any theories. All of these religious-cosmological similes 
must be cashed in terms of descriptions of phenomena 
“already in plain view”.  Thus, what Z608 really suggests 
is that human language arises, sozusagen, out of the 
chaotic Ganze Gewimmel of human actions at the centre 
of forms of human life.  However, though it is well and 
good to employ this liberating religious-cosmological 
picture, one wants a more concrete and believable account 
of this process.  Fortunately, such an account is found in 
Austrian economics.
6 NB (84) identifies man as the microcosm but Wittgenstein, at TLP 
(5.63), employing the indexical, “I,” states of himself that he is the 
microcosm.  In fact, the less solipsistic formulation in NB is more 
in harmony with the emphasis on the social community in his later 
philosophy but this does not affect the present point.
3 .   T H E  A U S T R I A N  “ E C O N O M I C 
CALCULATION ARGUMENT”
The evenly rotating economy is a fictitious system in which the 
market prices of all goods … coincide with the final prices. … 
The system is in perpetual flux, but it … revolves evenly round 
a fixed center, … The plain state of rest is disarranged again and 
again but it is instantly reestablished …
                                        Mises, Human Action (1996, § XIV.5) 
Although the Austrian school was begun in the late 19th-
early 20th centuries in Vienna by a group of Austrians, one 
need not be an Austrian to belong to the Austrian school 
(e.g., Jevons was English and Walrus French).  The Austrian 
school denotes a set of ideas begun in Austria by Austrians 
but it soon crossed national boundaries.  Further, it is 
customary to distinguish between first-wave and second-
wave Austrians.  Many first-wave “Austrians” trace their 
views to Adam Smith’s conception of laissez faire but some 
second-wave members such as the Rothbard (Rockwell, 
2014, p.153), criticize Smith.  Similarly, although Friedman 
is usually identified with the Chicago School, the two 
schools often overlap (Miller, 1962; Garrison, 1996, note 2). 
Thus, Friedman, Hayek, Stigler, Popper, and Mises founded 
the Mont Pelerin Society to promote the free-market 
principles of “neoliberalism” (Harvey, 2007, pp.20-22). The 
present task is simplified by the fact that the present paper 
seeks only to clarify those ideas of the first-wave Austrians 
with which Wittgenstein can be expected to have been 
acquainted.  
The key Austrian thesis is the “economic calculation 
argument” (hereafter ECA) that socialism inevitably fails 
due to an inability to do justice to the complexity of the 
market.  The present paper is not, however, committed 
to defend ECA per se.  Hayek and Mises understand 
socialism to involve a central planning but some have 
argued that socialist models without central planning are 
conceivable (Nove, 1992, pp.40, 45-49).  Thus, it might 
be more accurate to describe ECA as an argument against 
economic central planning rather than socialism as such, 
but the question in the present paper is not whether ECA 
succeeds against socialism.  It is whether it provides a 
useful simile for illuminating Wittgenstein’s philosophical 
views.  
One basic theses of ECA is that a “socialist” economy, 
where production decisions are made by some central body, 
cannot cope with all the information needed to make such 
decisions effectively (Hayek, 2011b, p.491, 495, etc.). 
Since the decision-making center of a socialist economy is 
a central body (such as a bureaucrat in a Moscow), call 
this kind of central decision-making body a “centreb.” 
Hayek (1945, p.526; Sharbek, 2009, p.109) sees market-
prices as essential information-mechanisms.  Note that 
prices as such are not such information-mechanismss. 
Someone in a Moscow centralb cubicle might decide 
that the price of a litre of vodka should be 2 roubles, 
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but this kind of price conveys no information—except 
about what one Moscow bureaucrat thinks.  In a market-
economy, by contrast, the price arises, not in the Moscow 
centreb, but in the actual home of the market-activities 
were the goods are produced.  
A second basic thesis of the early Austrians is that the 
value of goods is not determined by the intrinsic value of 
the goods or by the labour involved in producing them 
but by the value that acting individuals place on the good 
(Birner & Zijp, 1994, p.94; Gordon, 2000, pp.185-86).  In a 
market-economy, the value of a good is the value that arises 
from the subjective valuations of active members of that 
market.  
One should not infer that the Austrian model completely 
eschews any notion of a centre.   Smith, in The Wealth of 
Nations, writes:
Home is in this manner the centre … round which the capitals of 
the inhabitants of every country are continually circulating, and 
towards which they are always tending, … (Chap. 2).
The natural price … is, as it were, the central price, to which the 
prices Of all commodities are continually gravitating. (Chap. 7).   
Mises (1996, § 15.1) employs similar imagery, 
The market is the focal point to which the activities of the 
individuals converge. It is the centre from which the activities of 
the individuals radiate.
Since there is no physical gravity here, talk of market 
“centres of gravity” is a simile. That is, the financial 
capital in a country, sozusagen, gravitates towards its 
“home market”, and the activities at this economic 
centresoc determine the natural price of a good.  But how 
do these activities in the centresoc fix the natural price?
Whereas a socialist economy requires a centralb body, 
such as a Moscow bureaucrat, to set the price, a market-
economy revolves, sozusagen, around the centersoc of the 
market-actors.  The Austrians are speaking loosely when 
they say that they oppose centrally planned economies.  It 
is more accurate to say that they distinguish a centreb from 
a centresoc and that they oppose economies based on the 
former and support economies based on the latter.  Just 
as Copernicus distinguished a central earth and a central 
sun and argued for the replacement of the former by the 
latter, the Austrians distinguish economies based on a 
centreb from those based on a centresoc and argue for the 
replacement of the former by the latter.
Note also that in a free-market it is natural to speak 
of the centresoc as the centre towards which the market 
activities are always gravitating.  The financial capital in 
a country is, sozusagen, always gravitating towards its 
“home market” because this is where the natural price 
of a good is determined.  But how do the activities in the 
centresoc fix the natural price?
Hayek (2011a) does not think one will find the 
answer in the main economic models of his day because 
these are dominated by Aristotle’s anti-evolutionistic 
view that the given order is fixed from all time. Thus, he 
(2011a) proposes an ancient evolutionary idea, tracing to 
Hesiod (2009), that order arises from chaos, as a model 
for free-markets.  
This ancient idea that the economic order arises 
from “chaos” may seem mysterious.  However, in his 
discussion of Hayek’s Road to Serfdom, Friedman 
clarifies the idea.  Referring to Hayek view that prices 
are information-mechanisms, Friedman (1994) points out 
that, even though “no one knows how to make a pencil” 
(i.e., no one person knows all the complexities involved, 
facts about the best kind rubber, the right kind of wood, 
the way to machine that kind of wood, the processing of 
graphite, etc., not to mention all the languages, customs, 
laws, etc., involved in producing a simple pencil—let 
alone a car, a supercomputer or a spaceship), the market, 
seemingly effortlessly, produces an abundance of excellent 
cheap pencils all the time.7  Referring to this seemingly 
miraculous feat, Friedman (1994) remarks,
It’s a marvelous example of how you can get a complex structure 
of cooperation and coordination which … no individual who sat 
in a central office [planned] …  It was a market that coordinated 
all this.
It is, “sozusagen,” out of the “chaos” of the market, the 
“chaos” of customs, facts, languages, rules, governments, 
etc., each of which is constantly changing and which no 
single person could possibly understand, that the price of 
a simple pencil somehow “arises”.
Hayek does not claim that the market is literally 
chaotic.  To a layman, a swarm of bees might seem 
chaotic, but an entomologist can see the order there. 
Similarly, the swarming behavior of the market-actors 
might seem chaotic from a distance (e.g., from Moscow), 
but each part of the process may be perfectly orderly. 
Anwar, in Malaysia, may not even know that the rubber 
he taps goes to produce pencils, but he knows everything 
about getting the sap from the tree.  Ching, in Singapore, 
who buys the sap from Anwar’s boss, knows nothing 
about tapping rubber, but he knows how to use formic 
acid to coagulate it into a suitable form for transport. 
Andy, in Australia, knows nothing about either Anwar’s 
or Ching’s expertise, but he knows how to find the best 
buyers around the world, etc.. 
Hayek (1991, pp.6, 73, 83-84, 102, 146, etc.; Wagner, 
2010,  p.5, 10, 51, etc.) think of the generation of 
economic order, i.e., an appropriate system of prices, 
from market chaos as a spontaneous process.  Each of 
the actors in the process is free in the sense that their 
actions are not dictated by some centralb controller. 
Anwar does not tap rubber trees the way he does because 
Vlad in Moscow told him to do so.  He does it that way 
because that is the way he and his father before him 
7 Friedman (1990, pp.11-19, 274) also discusses the 
pencil-example in some detail.
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have successfully managed to support their families for a 
century.  The same is true of Ching and Andy.  They all, 
however, are answerable to the centralsoc market, but that is 
not like being subject to a centralb controller.  When Vlad, 
in his centralb cubicle in Moscow, decides that a pencil 
should cost 20 cents, this generally frustrates Anwar and 
Ching.  Since Vlad knows nothing about making pencils, 
he does not know what it really costs to produce one. 
Making a pencil looks so simple from Moscow.  One just 
fastens some wood, graphite, and rubber together.  By 
contrast, when the centralsoc market makes it unprofitable 
to process rubber in the way Ching’s family has been 
doing it for generations, i.e., if the Indonesians are now 
doing it more cheaply than they had done it before, this 
is useful information for Ching.  If Ching adopts this new 
process before his Thai competitors do, he can make a 
great profit.  This is how the market informs him about a 
more efficient way to process rubber sap—and everyone, 
including Ching, benefits in the long run, from the 
advances of his Indonesian competitors. The whole world 
will get a cheaper pencil next year, and Ching’s family, for 
the first time in a century, can afford to send a child abroad 
to study.
In summary, the Austrians distinguish between the 
centreb of socialism and the centresoc of market-economies. 
The former is inevitably ignorant of all the required 
factors to sustain an efficient economy (resulting in self-
destructive pricing).  By contrast, since the centresoc is the 
“home” of the market-actors, it is well placed to generate 
the appropriate price.  For this reason, one might say 
that in a market economy the market prices are always 
gravitating towards this centralsoc home—for that is where 
the action is.  Although the centreb can generate prices in 
a very orderly manner (the “central plan” drawn up by a 
distinguished committee of experts), the centresoc relies 
on the “chaos” of the market.  One might think that this 
puts the socialist economy in a stronger position, but the 
opposite is the case. The seeming order in the socialist plan 
is bought at the price of ignorance of the overwhelming 
complexity in the real world market.  By contrast, the 
“chaos” in the market-centresoc really signifies nothing 
other than the market’s capacity for a fine-tuned sensitivity 
to the real world complexity.  This “fine tuning” might 
look chaotic from Moscow, but it is just right when seen 
from the home of the market actors where the goods are 
produced, priced, and used. 
4.  THE AUSTRIAN MODEL OF ZETTEL 
608    
If I am inclined to suppose that a mouse has come into being by 
spontaneous generation out of grey rags and dust, I shall do well 
to examine those rags very closely to see how a mouse may have 
hidden in them, …But if I am convinced that a mouse cannot 
have come into being from these  things then this investigation 
will [seem] superfluous. But first we must … understand what it 
is that opposes such an examination of details in philosophy.
         Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (1958, pgh. 52) 
Each of the sentences I write is trying to say … the same thing 
over and over again.
                                Wittgenstein, Culture and Value (1980, p.7)  
If each of Wittgenstein’s sentences is attempting to say 
the same thing, then PI (52) is saying the same thing as 
Z608—and, in fact, Z608 has far more to do with PI (52) 
than it does with any of the verboten theories of NI.  The 
idea in PI (52) of the spontaneous generation of a mouse 
from dust is taken from the history of science (Harris, 
2002, p.5), but Wittgenstein does not believe that mice 
spontaneously arise from dust and rags.  He employs 
this historical image as a useful simile for the genesis of 
meaningL.  In (PI, 51) he asks how meaningL arises from 
the “technique of using signs” (PI, 51).  Thus, the mouse 
in PI (52) symbolizes meaningL and the “grey rags and 
dust” symbolize the “technique of using signs”. What PI 
(52) suggests is, sozusagen, that the “mouse of meaningL” 
arises spontaneously from the “grey rags and dust,” the 
chaos, in the uses of words.8 Alternatively, using the other 
image in PI (52), the passage suggests that meaningL is 
somehow hidden in the “grey rags and dust” of the uses of 
words—the point being that it is not really hidden, but that 
one must look very closely at the details to see it there.
Wittgenstein thinks that philosophers tend to oppose 
such a close examination of the details.  This close 
examination of the details in the use of words is, roughly, 
what he means by “philosophical grammar” (PI, 664). 
Since philosophers oppose such a close examination of 
the details, they are driven to posit different kinds of 
account, such as neurophysiological accounts, of the 
genesis of meaningL. When, however, one realizes that 
meaningL “arises” from the uses of words, there is no 
longer any need to propose such neurophysiological 
theories. That is, Z608 no more proposes a theory about 
the brain than PI (52) does.  But is not the idea of order 
arising spontaneously from chaos, in any form, just too 
mysterious?
In fact, each item in Wittgenstein’s account of the 
genesis of meaningL finds a parallel in the Austrian 
economic model.   The market-price in Austrian 
economics corresponds to meaningL.  The activities of 
the market-actors constitute the “centre of gravity” of 
the market.  Since the market, sozusagen, “revolves” 
around these activities (Ekelund & Herbert, 1995, p.357), 
they constitute the “Angelpunkt of our real need” (to 
8 If the idea that the use of words is too chaotic to support an account 
of meaningL seems obscure, recall that Kripke (1982, pp.9-11, 
etc.) argues that one cannot find the required meaning-fact in mere 
linguistic-usage.  An analogous point is implicit in Quine’s (1960, 
72ff) thesis about the indeterminacy of translation.
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understand how free-markets spontaneously generate 
prices).  Though these activities at the centre of the market 
are, sozusagen, chaotic, it is out of this creative “chaos” 
at the market-centre that the natural price “arises.”  Just 
as Z608 suggests that meaningL arises, sozusagen, out of 
the chaos at the centre of human forms of life, the Austrian 
economic model suggests that the natural price arises, 
sozusagen, out of the chaos of activities at the centre of 
human economic forms of life.
Just as Wittgenstein’s claims in Z608 are qualified by 
a “sozusagen,” the claims by the Austrian economists 
are similarly qualified.  The activities of the economic 
actors in the market do not really produce a gravitational 
field. The market does not really “revolve” around those 
activities.  The natural price does not really arise from 
market activities.  These market activities are not literally 
chaotic.  The Austrian economic notions of the center of 
gravity, chaos, arising, etc., are similes used to convey an 
illuminating picture of the way free-markets, sozusagen, 
“spontaneously” generate prices.
Unlike the religious similes employed in RCI, the 
Austrian model provides a concrete comprehensible 
account of the way the natural price “arises”.  There is 
nothing in principle mysterious about how a plethora 
of market-actors from different languages and cultures 
spread out across the globe are brought together in the 
market to produce an abundance of cheap excellent 
pencils that benefit everyone.  Friedman (1990, p.3) 
refers to the generation of wealth by the free-market as 
a “miracle”, but there is really nothing miraculous about 
it.  The Austrian model makes no appeal to a divine 
controller, an elan vital, or religious similes. The Austrian 
model appeals only to what everyone is familiar with in 
their everyday life, namely, how human beings making 
free transactions with others who possess skills they 
themselves lack combine to produce mutually beneficial 
results.   Unlike NI, which conjures out of Z608 the very 
sorts of causal theories that Wittgenstein vehemently 
and repeatedly rejects, the Austrian model invokes forms 
of economic life that precisely parallel Wittgenstein’s 
forms of life.  Scholars need not, therefore, fear that Z608 
envisages connectionist engines, quantum indeterminacy, 
or piles of sawdust in the cranial cavity.  Z608 is a portrait, 
not of hidden chaotic neurophysiological processes, but, 
sozusagen, of the creative chaos in human life displayed, 
as the Austrian economists claim,9 by free-markets 
“already before one’s eyes.”
9 Kripke (1982, p.112) opines that there is some merit to ECA’s 
argument against socialism, and he may be right.   Recall, however, 
that the present paper is not committed to defend ECA as an 
economic thesis but only as a simile for the genesis of meaningL in 
Z608.  The present philosophical appropriation of this economic 
simile does not deny the enormous amount of empirical work that 
remains to be done in economics proper in this connection.  The 
study of the emergence of economic complexity is in its “infancy” 
(Beaudreau, 2011, 277ff).
5.  THE AUSTRIAN MODEL OF THE 
PRIVATE LANGUAGE ARGUMENT
[A] private language is one that is … necessarily private, in as 
much as  it is used by some particular person to refer only to his 
own experiences. 
              Ayer, “Can there Be a Private Language?” (1966,  p.253)
Since Kripke introduces the idea of a parallel between 
Austrian economics and Wittgenstein’s “Private Language 
Argument” (hereafter PLA), it is useful to show how 
the Austrian model of Z608 relates to PLA.  Since it is 
impossible to do justice to PLA here, the present aim is 
only briefly to sketch this analogy.
The idea behind PLA is that when S truly says, “I 
feel pain,” she is stating something that she alone can 
understand it because she alone knows the referent of 
her expression “my pain”.  Her word “pain” belongs to 
her private language and no one else can understand as 
she does.  This notion of a private language presupposes 
the notion of a private center by reference to which the 
meanings of the words in that language are determined. 
In most versions, this private center is something like a 
Cartesian ego (hidden behind the language-user’s public 
presence as they describe their private experiences).  One 
could, however, imagine that a material object like a brain 
is such a center insofar it describes its experiences from 
the unique neural position that it alone enjoys.  That is, 
the key notion here is the notion of a private center of 
experience— which can come both in materialist and 
immateriality forms.
Wittgenstein’s argument against the idea of such a 
language is that since, ex hypothesis, a private language 
does not admit public standards, whatever seems to that 
private center to be right is right.  But, Wittgenstein holds, 
that is incoherent.  If whatever will seem to the private 
center to be right is right, then one cannot speak of right 
or wrong here (PI, 201, 258).  But without a standard 
for right and wrong one does not have a language—only 
babbling.
Compare this picture of a private language with the 
picture of a private price for an economic good!  Recall 
that Vlad, in his centralb cubicle in Moscow, believes he 
knows the price of the pencil produced by a plethora of 
market-actors scattered around the globe.  He is quite 
certain about the price because he decides it himself. 
What seems to Vlad to be the right price is the right 
price.   If he decides a pencil should cost 50 cents, 
then it costs 50 cents.  His certainty about the cost of 
a pencil mirrors Jane’s certainty about the meaning of 
her word “pain”.  Just as Vlad in his centralb Moscow 
cubicle can decide the price of a pencil, Jane alone in her 
consciousness or brain can decide the meaning of her 
words.
The problem for Vlad’s position arises when his private 
decision about the price runs up against the reality of the 
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market-place.  For Vlad’s price, decided in the sublime 
privacy of his centralb cubicle, has nothing to do with 
the real price of producing pencils.  The real (natural) 
price of producing pencils is decided in the “chaos” of 
activities in the centresoc of the market-place. Of course, 
that is precisely what Vlad finds unacceptable. Why, he 
reasons, should the price of pencils for the long-suffering 
masses be determined by the chaotic activities of hoards 
of market actors around the globe?  Everything would 
be so much more orderly if a centralb bureaucrat decides 
the price.  The Austrian reply is that it is precisely in 
that market “chaos” that the price runs up against the 
economic realities.  If Vlad wishes to understand the 
real economic value of goods, he must abandon the 
unworldly security of his centralb Moscow cubicle and 
face the “chaos” of the market where the natural prices 
of goods aise in proximity with the actual production of 
those goods.  
Z608 can be construed as a critique of the neural 
version of the PLA  Just as the natural price in a free-
market, sozusagen, “arises,” not in some centralb cubicle, 
but in the chaossoc at the market-centersoc where human 
activities encounter the economic realities, so the 
meaningsL of words arise, not in the biological processes 
hidden at the neural centreb, but, sozusagen, in the chaotic 
Ganze Gewimmel of human activities in the linguistic 
centersoc of gravity where were human activities run up 
against the realities of linguistic usage.
6.  THE ULTIMATE GIVEN: FORMS OF 
LIFE
Materialist monism contends that human thoughts and volitions 
are the product of the … cells of the brain and nerves. … 
[But this] is a metaphysical hypothesis, although it supporters 
consider it as … undeniable scientific truth.  …  Human 
action … is an element of cosmic activity … [U]nder present 
conditions—it cannot be traced back to its causes, it must be 
considered as an ultimate given and … studied as such. 
                                                Mises, Human Action (1996, § I.3)
What has to be accepted, the given, is—so one could say—forms 
of life.
            Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (1958, p.226).
Perhaps the most basic analogy between Wittgenstein’s 
philosophical views and early Austrian economics is 
that both hold that human activities are the ultimate 
given.  Mises understands this to imply that thoughts 
cannot be traced back to their neural causes—but that 
is the opening claim of Z608.10  Hayek (1955, p.49) 
10 Mises does state a qualifier absent in Wittgenstein: “Under present 
conditions …”.   However, the present paper argues only that 
Wittgenstein’s views are analogous to those in Austrian economics, 
not that it is identical with them.  See note 12 below!
makes a similar claim: “[I]t would follow that it is 
impossible that our brain should ever be able to produce 
a complete explanation … of the particular ways it itself 
classifies external phenomena.”—but in that case, the 
brain could never produce a complete explanation of 
the classifications it itself employs in the meaningfulL 
sentences that it produces.  Once again, that is equivalent 
to the claim in Z608.
Significantly, both Mises and Wittgenstein cite the 
same passage from Goethe in support of their respective 
views that human intelligence is grounded in action
 As an a priori category the principle of action is on a par with 
the principle of causality.  It is present in all knowledge of any 
conduct that goes beyond an unconscious reaction. “In the 
beginning was the deed”. (Mises, 2003, p.15)
Language - I want to say - is a refinement, “In the beginning was 
the deed” (CV, 31).11  
Note that if die Tat is really “the beginning” of human 
language, then language cannot be the product of a prior 
beginning in the brain.  Once again—that is the central 
point in Z608. Mises stresses that the “given” is not just 
another phenomena that requires explanation but must be 
“studied” in the way appropriate to the given.  He  (1996, 
§ II.2) calls his investigation of this given phenomenon 
“praxeology.” Since praxeology investigates this a 
priori phenomenon, Mises (1996, II.2) calls his view 
methodological apriorism.  
Although Wittgenstein tends to avoid appeal to the a 
priori as such, seeing this as bound up with misleading 
philosophical pictures (PI, 158), he does hold that his 
philosophical descriptions are undeniable:  “If one 
tried to advance theses in philosophy, it would never 
be possible to debate them because everything would 
agree to them” (PI, 27).  Because of his longstanding 
view that there are no philosophical propositions per se 
(TLP, 6.54),  expresses this in the indirect manner of PI 
(127), but his point is that even if someone managed to 
formulate a philosophical “proposition” it would state 
something so  central to human life that it would be 
incontestable.  Similarly, Mises (1996, II.3), referring 
to the “theorems” of praxeology, states that they are 
“incontestable” descriptions of the “reality of action”.12 
Wittgenstein states that “we must do away with all 
explanation” (PI, 109).  Mises (1996, II.2) writes, on 
similar grounds, that “It is impossible to explain [the 
11 See also Wittgenstein, OC (402), Winch (1981), and Monk (1990, 
p.306)!
12 Wittgenstein’s position is analogous to Mises’ view except that 
Mises still thinks in terms of theorems and propositions.  Indeed, 
this may be the crucial modification Wittgenstein makes to the 
Austrian model when he applies it to the genesis of meaningL.  It 
is worth noting that Hayek did not embrace Mises’ formulation of 
praxeology (Wozinski, 2010).   But Hayek (1955, 46ff) does develop 
his own account of the given and its roots in action in his critique of 
scientism.  See note 10 above!
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theorems of praxeology] to a being who would not 
possess them on his own.”13
Scholars are, therefore, mistaken in thinking that 
the argument in Z608 has anything essential to do 
with the brain.   Although Z608 is addressed to the 
neurophysiological version of the view that language 
is produced by prior realities, one could rewrite Z608 
to address other versions of this view. Two of the more 
obvious possible rewritings are:
Z608': No supposition seems more natural to me than that there 
is no process in a Cartesian ego correlating with associating or 
with thinking; …
Z608'':   No supposition seems more natural to me than that there 
is no process in the faculties of sensibility and understanding 
correlating with associating or with thinking; …
The argument in Z608 has no more essentially to do 
with the brain than it does with Cartesian egos, Leibniz’s 
monads, Kant’s transcendental unity of apperception, etc. 
The argument in Z608 is based on the given character 
of human action—the view that one cannot get behind 
action to something more basic. That is, the argument 
in Z608 is “phenomenological” in a broad sense of 
the word.14 The brain appears in Z608 only as the most 
common materialist form of the view that meaningL 
is grounded in something more basic.  As surprising 
as it may seem, Z608 simply makes explicit what 
Wittgenstein means at PI (230).  That is, if what must be 
accepted, the given, is “forms of life,” then one cannot 
explain these forms of life (and the meaningL that “arises” 
in them) by reference to “prior” neural processes. 
Although scholars have expressed shock at the heretical 
theories they see in Z608, what is really shocking about 
Z608 is not that it suggests that there may be sawdust, 
causal indeterminacy, or connectionist architecture in the 
brain.  Wittgenstein states what are really shocking about 
Z608 at (PI, 129), where, referring to philosophers, he 
writes,
The real foundations of his enquiry do not strike a man at all.  
Unless that fact has at some time struck him.—And this means: 
we fail to be struck by what, once seen, is most striking and 
most powerful.  
What is really shocking in Z608 is that it suggests 
that meaningL spontaneously arises, not out of neural 
chaos, but, sozusagen, out of the chaos, the “grey rags 
and dust”, of human activities. In the terminology of 
Austrian phenomenology, what is really shocking in Z608 
is the “discovery” that meaningL is a denizen of the “life-
13 Compare Wittgenstein’s “Nothing hidden” (PI, 435) with Mises’ 
(2003, p.50) rejection of “metaphysical” views that purport to reveal 
what is “hidden to profane eyes”.
14 For a discussion of the connection between Austrian economics 
and Austrian phenomenology see Kurrild-Klitgaard (2003).  See 
also note 15! 
world.”15  It is the discovery that the resolution of one’s 
problems about meaningL had been right “before one’s 
eyes” all the time but that one had been “unable to notice” 
it for that very reason (PI, 129).
It is, of course, odd to speak of a “discovery” of 
something that is always before one’s eyes. In fact, it 
is a bit like the unsettling “discovery” by the famous 
Austrian psychologist, Freud, that one has always loved 
one’s mother and hated one’s father.16 Perhaps this is why 
philosophers whose paradigms involve positing hidden 
neural mechanisms, cannot believe that Wittgenstein 
means what he says when he states one must not advance 
any kind of theory or explanation.  Since he cannot mean 
what he says, he must be making a shocking claim about 
these hidden mechanisms, perhaps that they don’t exist at 
all or that they are replaced by something bizarre (sawdust 
in the cranium, etc.).  But Wittgenstein makes no such 
claims. S1 (See § I) affirms the standard scientific belief 
in the existence of a brain-behaviour correlation.  What 
Wittgenstein claims in Z608 is that, for the purposes of his 
problem of meaningL, this brain-behaviour “System” is like 
a beetle in a box that can never be opened (Cf. PI, 293). 
That is, since he holds that meaningL is, sozusagen, at 
home, not “in the head”, but in forms of life, the existence 
of this brain-behaviour system is irrelevant to the living 
phenomenon of meaningL.  Z608 only states something 
shocking if one already believes the metaphysical view 
that such life-phenomenon must be caused by something 
more basic.  If (as Mises points out) one already holds 
that metaphysical view, then the “reminder” (PI, 89, 127, 
etc.) that meaningL is “always before one’s eyes” must be 
shocking. 
There is a tendency by many mainstream academics 
to view both Austrian economics and Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy of language as strange interlopers into their 
respective fields. Russell, who held Wittgenstein’s early 
philosophy in great esteem, could see no merit whatsoever 
in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy (Monk, 1990, p.472). 
Similarly, many mainstream economists see Austrian 
economics as heterodox and unscientific.  But if the 
present paper is correct, Wittgenstein’s philosophy of 
language and Austrian economics are both applications 
of the same distinctively Austrian paradigm for thinking 
15 Although Brentano and Husserl form part of the philosophical 
background the Austrian school the sort of given emphasized by 
Wittgenstein and the Austrian economists is qualitatively different 
from that emphasized by these phenomenologists.  The given-ness 
of lived actions is qualitatively different from the alleged given-
ness of perceptual data.  Thus, the Mises-Wittgenstein notion of 
the given would, prima facia, escape the arguments Sellars (1991, 
pp.140-141, etc.) mounts against “the myth of the given”.   Despite 
this significant qualification, the Austrian phenomenological model 
is closer to Wittgenstein’s real position in Z608 than the most un-
Wittgensteinian thesis NI.
16 Heaton (2000) discusses the analogies between Wittgenstein’s 
views and psychoanalysis.
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about a wide variety of human phenomena.17 If, as 
Kuhn (1970) points out, one attempts to understand new 
paradigms by reference to the very paradigms they are 
is opposing, then Z608 must seem to be asserting some 
strange thesis (that humans beings might literally not 
need brains to think)—which is simply not Wittgenstein’s 
view.18  Z608 is in a real sense a very Austrian passage, 
the real point of Z608 emerges when one compares it with 
the Austrian views about spontaneous arising of economic 
order from the chaos at the center of gravity of the market. 
Indeed, each of these Austrian views, one philosophical 
and one economic, is illuminated by comparison with 
the other and recognized as different applications of a 
common paradigm. Neither Z608 nor Austrian economics 
are concerned with hidden mechanisms or hidden 
“essences.  Both are, rather, concerned with that which 
is “always before one’s eyes” but which one fails to see 
because of its “simplicity and familiarity”—namely, the 
creative chaos of human activities at the true “centre of 
gravity” of forms of human activities.
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